Maquiladora industry: past, present and future by Jesus Canas & Roberto Coronado
Mexico’s maquiladora industry is currently the focus of
much attention on the border, in the media, in corporate
boardrooms and among Mexican government officials.
After seeing the maquiladora industry sustain its biggest
employment decline ever in 2001, many observers are
questioning the industry’s future in Mexico.
This article gives an overview of this important
industry—from its inception in the 1960s to its heyday in
the 1980s, the boom following the implementation of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
its current condition. We conclude that even though in-
creased manufacturing activity in other countries such
as China has produced a tougher global manufacturing
market, Mexico remains attractive for foreign direct
investment. However, structural reforms are needed to
maintain the competitive advantages Mexico has devel-
oped over the past three decades.
THE RISE OF PRODUCTION SHARING
The second half of the 20th century was marked by
a dramatic increase in world trade. Between 1970 and
2000, world trade increased almost fivefold, or more
than 370 percent. At the same time, world GDP in-
creased 150 percent. Chart 1 shows the relationship
between increasing world trade and rising world GDP.
Trade allows countries to allocate natural, labor and
capital resources more efficiently. As a result, produc-
tivity increases, which in turn improves income and,
hence, living standards.
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Trade gains occur as nations specialize according 
to their comparative advantage. Comparative advantage
implies that a country can produce a good or service 
at a lower opportunity cost than other countries. If this
is  the case, countries achieve efficiency by exporting
goods and services with lower opportunity costs and




are less favorable 





in the long run.
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BusinessFrontierProduction sharing has played a key role in
the growth of world trade in recent decades. In
production sharing, the processes used to manu-
facture a good are conducted in more than one
country. Production sharing, or trade in interme-
diate goods, represents more than $800 billion in
trade annually, or at least 30 percent of world
trade in manufactured goods.
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Several factors account for this remarkable
upward trend in production sharing. First, large
cross-country cost differences have arisen as richer
countries have established more environmental
and work-related rules. Second, falling tariffs—a
byproduct of growing membership in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO)—have lowered
the penalty on imports. Third, shipping and trans-
portation costs have fallen dramatically as pack-
ing innovations increase storage and transport
capacity.
In addition, information technology has reduced
data, search and communication costs, making it
much easier and less expensive for firms to set up
and maintain offshore operations. For example,
the Internet has enabled firms to more closely
synchronize orders with inventories and sales, in-
creasing efficiency and reducing operating costs.
And finally, more firms have turned to production
sharing to stay competitive. Once one firm initiates
production sharing to cut costs, others are forced
to do the same to maintain their competitive edge.
Traditional trade theory predicts that capital,
and hence investment, flows to where the return
is highest. This is typically where the supply of
capital is scarce and labor is abundant. According
to theory, capital-rich nations such as the United
States should export capital to relatively capital-
poor countries like Mexico and China. This was
the thinking in the 1960s, when Mexico imple-
mented economic development initiatives like the
maquiladora program on its northern border to
take advantage of production sharing. The border
area had little capital investment but a plentiful
labor force.
Today, maquiladora-led U.S.–Mexico trade is
primarily intra-industry trade. About 80 percent 
of U.S. trade with Mexico is intra-industry.
3 This
article follows the development of Mexico’s ma-
quiladora industry in an era of increasing world
trade and global production sharing.
INTRODUCTION OF MAQUILADORAS
The impetus for the maquiladora program, ini-
tially called the Border Industrialization Program,
came in 1965 after the United States terminated
the Bracero program. The main objective of the
Bracero program was to bring in Mexican workers
to fulfill U.S. agricultural labor demand. The end
of the Bracero program left thousands of unem-
ployed farm workers in Mexican border cities.
The maquiladora program was designed to
alleviate the resultant unemployment and growing
poverty. Contrary to Mexico’s Import Substitution
Industrialization regime at that time, the maquila-
dora program’s intent was to subsidize foreign
manufacturers that set up plants on the Mexican
side of the border, creating jobs for Mexican
workers. The maquiladora program allowed plants
to temporarily import supplies, parts, machinery and
equipment necessary to produce goods and ser-
vices in Mexico duty-free as long as the output was
exported back to the United States. The United
States, in turn, taxed only the value-added portion
of the manufactured product.
The maquiladora industry experienced slow
but steady growth during the early years. By 1969,
147 companies, employing about 17,000 workers,
were registered under the Border Industrialization
Program. The first two industrial parks were built
almost simultaneously in Ciudad Juárez, across from
El Paso, Texas, and Nogales, across from Nogales,
Arizona. Tijuana and Mexicali, across from San
Diego and Calexico, California, respectively, and
Reynosa and Matamoros, across from McAllen and
Brownsville, Texas, followed.
U.S. firms responded enthusiastically to the lure
of cheap labor, particularly in electronics, textiles,
footwear and toys and, later, in auto parts. RCA,
Convertors, Sylvania, Centralab, Acapulco Fashion
and Ampex were among the first U.S. companies
to set up maquiladora operations. The new indus-
try was not immune to business cycles, however.
It suffered its first crisis in 1974 when maquiladora
employment fell 11.5 percent in response to a U.S.
recession.
Chart 1
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World Trade Organization.THREE STAGES OF MAQUILADORA GROWTH
After the initial phase, maquiladora industry
employment growth falls into three periods: high
growth (1983–89), consolidation (1990–94) and
post–NAFTA growth (1995–present) (Chart 2). The
high-growth era started with the 1982 peso deval-
uation. Because most maquiladoras have dollar-
denominated budgets but pay costs in pesos, the
1982 devaluation substantially reduced peso-
denominated operating costs. In 1986, Mexico also
joined GATT, abandoning 42 years of protection-
ism and antitrade sentiment. Mexico started to
eliminate its complicated import-licensing program
and reduce high import tariffs. Consequently,
maximum tariff rates in Mexico fell from 60 per-
cent to 15 percent by 1990.
4 These changes began
to attract more foreign companies to Mexico. From
1983 to 1989, maquiladora employment grew at an
annual average rate of 19.2 percent.
The deceleration and consolidation era was
characterized by a strong peso performance—
from 1990 to 1994, the peso depreciated only 
3 percent per year—and continuing economic
openness. In 1992, Mexico signed a free trade
agreement with Chile, and the following year it
joined Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, the
primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade
and economic cooperation among Asian–Pacific
economies. The next year, Mexico finalized NAFTA
with the United States and Canada and became 
a member of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development. During the 1990–94
period, maquiladora employment grew an aver-
age 6.3 percent per year.
Mexico’s December 1994 peso devaluation and
the recently signed NAFTA gave a second boost to
the maquiladora industry. The peso depreciation
of over 60 percent encouraged maquiladoras to
again expand operations. Maquiladora employment
grew 11 percent per year, on average, from 1995
to 2001. By 2001, overall maquiladora employ-
ment had increased 300-fold since 1967, and
maquiladora exports represented almost half of
Mexico’s total exports. In addition, the maquiladora
industry generated more than $19 billion in for-
eign exchange that same year. In fact, since 1998
maquiladoras have been Mexico’s top foreign-
exchange generator, followed by oil and natural
gas, migrant remittances and tourism (Chart 3).
Further, the industry employs almost 10 percent 
of Mexico’s formal sector workers, equivalent to
about 3 percent of the country’s total labor force.
EVOLUTIONARY CHANGES
Trends in maquiladora employment do not tell
the whole story. While jobs have grown, maquila-
doras themselves have changed drastically since
1965. Carrillo and Hualde classify maquiladoras
into three generations based on the nature of their
manufacturing operation.
5 First-generation maquila-
doras are typical of the earliest plants: labor-inten-
sive with limited technology and dependent on de-
cisions made by parent companies and principal
clients. Textile maquiladoras are a typical example.
Second-generation plants are oriented less
toward assembly and more toward manufacturing
processes. Such firms use automated and semi-
automated machines and robotics. In addition,
they employ more technicians and engineers.
Maquiladora plants that manufacture auto har-
nesses, television sets and electrical appliances are
examples of second-generation plants.
Third-generation maquiladoras are oriented
toward research, design and development. They
Chart 2
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SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática.
Chart 3
Top Foreign-Exchange Generators for Mexico
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taría de Hacienda y Crédito Público; Instituto Nacional de
Estadística, Geografía e Informática. Maquiladoras, remit-
tances and tourism, Banco de México.rely on highly skilled labor, such as specialized
engineers and technicians. According to Carrillo
and Hualde, technological dependence on the
parent company disappears in third-generation
maquiladoras, and thus the decisionmaking be-
comes autonomous. By reducing project length,
operating costs and manufacturing time, producers
become more competitive. However, they are still
evaluated and certified by clients. Delphi Corp.’s
Mexico Technical Center in Ciudad Juárez is a good
example of a third-generation maquiladora. Delphi’s
Juárez operation employs about 700 Mexican engi-
neers to develop patented products, such as oil
sensor and brake systems for automobiles.
CURRENT CHALLENGES
The 2001 U.S. recession took a heavy toll on
Mexico’s maquiladora industry. From October 2000
to June 2002, the industry lost more than 240,000
jobs; plants in border states accounted for about
76 percent of these losses. Although the layoffs
along the border have far outweighed those in the
interior, the proportions reflect the concentration
of maquiladora jobs in border states, which account
for about 77 percent of total maquiladora employ-
ment. The number of maquiladora plants has 
also been affected. Whereas employment growth
turned negative in October 2000, the net number
of plants began to fall a bit later, in mid-2001.
From May 2001 to June 2002, about 420 plants
closed, three-fourths of them in border states.
The size of the industry’s contraction during
the most recent recession suggests there are more
factors at work than simply the effects of a mild
business cycle. The maquiladora industry faces some
serious domestic challenges, including increasing
labor costs and an environment of unprecedented
fiscal uncertainty.
Whereas in the past recurring peso devalua-
tions helped maquiladoras control costs, Mexico’s
recent macroeconomic stability has kept the peso
strong. Maquiladora wages, which account for about
51 percent of total maquiladora value added, have
grown consistently since 1996. It bears noting that
despite recent progress, real maquiladora wages
surpassed 1980 levels only this year (Chart 4).
However, other Mexican wages, such as the manu-
facturing wage and minimum wage, still remain
well below their 1980 levels, down 14 percent and
69 percent, respectively. In addition to employ-
ment benefits established by law, maquiladoras
face the added expense of providing workers with
transportation and food subsidies. Also, some
maquiladoras have worked with the Mexican gov-
ernment to build adequate and affordable housing
for workers and assist them with financing.
Another persistent domestic challenge is fiscal
uncertainty. Two 1990s tax law changes, “perma-
nent establishment” and NAFTA Article 303, threw
the maquiladora industry into fiscal confusion with
regard to both income and customs taxation. The
permanent establishment (PE) clause, added to
the Mexican tax code in 1998 and slated to take
effect in 2000, repealed the transitory status of
maquiladoras and required them to pay Mexican
income taxes in much the same way as the
domestic manufacturing industry.
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However, because the U.S. government would
not credit U.S. multinational corporations operat-
ing in Mexico any tax paid to the Mexican govern-
ment, the PE clause would have entailed double
taxation of maquiladora income. To temporarily
resolve this problem, in 1999 Mexican and U.S. tax
authorities created exceptions to the PE clause
with two provisions referred to as “safe harbor”
and advance pricing agreements (APAs).
7 To qual-
ify for an APA, a maquiladora submits a tax pro-
posal to the government. Unfortunately, response
times have been long; some maquiladoras are still
waiting to find out their tax liability from two or
three years ago. To make matters worse, safe har-
bor and APA rules were set to expire in December
2002. In August, Mexican officials prolonged the
fiscal uncertainty by extending the deadline to late
2007—apparently passing the responsibility of re-
solving this issue to the next administration. Thus,
long-term financial planning is still not possible
for maquiladoras and is a significant deterrent to
further investment in Mexico-based operations.
NAFTA Article 303 represents another aspect
of fiscal uncertainty for maquiladoras. As of Janu-
ary 2001, Article 303 eliminated duty-free imports
from non-NAFTA countries. The maquiladora in-
Chart 4
Hourly Wages: Maquiladora vs. Manufacturing
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Banco de México.dustry anticipated a large negative effect on opera-
tions as many components and other inputs would
become subject to tariffs. In response to the in-
dustry’s appeals, in December 2000 the Mexican
government passed a decree creating 20 Sectoral
Promotion Programs, one for each maquiladora
sector, to protect the tariff-free entry of non-NAFTA
components not readily available on the domestic
market. Sectoral Promotion Programs (Programas
de Promoción Sectorial, or PROSECs) allow maquila
and nonmaquila companies to apply for reduced
tariffs of 0 to 5 percent.
8 Despite the welcome
reprieve from Article 303, maquiladoras that apply
for a PROSEC must undertake extensive paper-
work to track the origin of thousands of parts
used in the production process.
RISING GLOBAL COMPETITION
Another challenge to the maquiladora industry
is rising global competition. The advantages of
operating plants in Mexico, such as low wages
and tax incentives, are now offered by a great
number of developing countries. At the same
time, location has become less important as inno-
vations in transportation and technology lower
shipping costs.
Countries around the globe have adopted
export-oriented manufacturing programs similar to
the Mexican maquiladora industry. Central Euro-
pean countries offer prospective assembly plants
tax-free imports of components and five- to 10-
year tax holidays on profits. For example, compa-
nies such as Audi AG, General Motors Corp., Ford
Motor Co., Suzuki Motor Corp., IBM Corp., TDK
Corp., Sony Corp., Royal Philips Electronics and
Samsung now operate in Hungary, producing
largely for the export market. India and Pakistan
have export-processing zones that offer export-
oriented industries fiscal and institutional incen-
tives as well as fully developed infrastructure in
the form of industrial parks.
Mexico has been especially concerned about
the opening up of China’s economy. It was ini-
tially opposed to China’s entry into the WTO last
year. Analysts estimate that China will generate 10
million jobs in services, textiles, garments and
nonfarm rural activities in its first five years of
WTO membership. There are plenty of anecdotes
of maquiladora plants moving operations from
Mexico to China. The transfer of a Royal Philips
Electronics plant and 900 jobs to China surprised
Cuidad Juárez in early July. A month earlier Arne-
ses de Juárez, an auto parts maquila, laid off about
800 employees and moved its operation to China.
Sanyo Electric Co. closed two of its six Tijuana
plants last year, laying off 1,884 employees; the
video components Sanyo once made in Tijuana
are now produced in China and Indonesia. Canon
shut an inkjet printer factory in Tijuana in March
and joined the exodus to Asia by shifting produc-
tion to Vietnam.
Although China is clearly becoming a leading
choice for many multinational manufacturing firms,
obstacles remain to long-term Chinese economic
development and continued growth. These include
heavy reliance on government spending, rising
public debt, insolvent state-owned banks and com-
panies, extensive state pension liabilities, low rural
incomes, high unemployment, huge disparities in
regional development, and undeveloped legal and
commercial systems.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Measured in today’s dollars, world trade is 10
times what it was in 1958, and production sharing
has been key to this growth. Through its ma-
quiladora program, Mexico has loomed large in
the intra-industry trade boom. Maquiladora employ-
ment has grown 300-fold since 1967, and maquila-
dora exports now account for half of Mexico’s
total exports. Some maquiladoras have evolved
from first-generation plants—labor-intensive with
limited technology—to third-generation businesses
that perform research, product design and devel-
opment. In recent years, however, the maquila-
doras have faced increasing labor costs, fiscal
uncertainty and fierce competition from other
developing countries.
For Mexico to remain a key player in global
production sharing, changes are needed. The gov-
ernment must introduce structural reforms as well
as clear and definite tax rules. Further, the ma-
quiladora industry must focus on developing more
efficient processes. Managers can no longer rely
on peso devaluations to absorb increasing labor
costs. Some maquilas are introducing new pro-
duction techniques, such as “lean manufacturing”
and cross-training, to achieve higher productivity
growth. Thus, as more capital-intensive manufac-
turing becomes the norm, employment growth
will likely be slower than in the past although
wages should be higher.
The challenges facing the maquiladora indus-
try provide an opportunity for positive change.
Although currently industry circumstances are less
favorable than in the past, Mexico remains a com-
petitor in the global production-sharing market in
the long run.
—Jesus Cañas and Roberto Coronado
Cañas and Coronado are economic analysts in the
Research Department at the El Paso Branch of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.NOTES
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